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THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT IN PERSPECTIVE
Introduction
On June 7th and 10th 1979, the electorate of the nine member
states of the European Economic Community directly elected the
members of the European Parliament. The election had centered
the focus of the media and the European public onto the institution
within the EEC which had, since its inception, existed in an ambigu-
ous position. The Parliament, or Assembly, as it is referred to in
the Treaty of Rome, had long suffered from a lack of identity.
Of the four major institutions that comprise the executive, legis-
lature and judiciary of the European Communities, the Parliament
has the most limited authority. Until June of 1979, it did not
represent the electorate, but was composed of representatives ap-
pointed by the parliaments of the nine member states. Its role was
therefore ambivalent, and with this handicap its struggle for recog-
nition and authority within the European Communities was
formidable.
The elections bestow upon the Parliament the necessary demo-
cratic legitimacy it has lacked since the creation of the European
Communities. It remains to be seen, however, whether this demo-
cratic legitimacy will change its role and increase its authority in the
decision-making process of the Communities.
The elections rekindled the debate on the future of the Euro-
pean Communities and the question of a European union. The
concept of a European union had received attention only within
the limited sphere of the Community institutions, receiving only
peripheral attention by the public at large. This brief survey focuses
on the position of the Parliament within the institutional framework
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of the European Communities, and investigates the present vision
of the state of a European union.
The survey intends to analyze the role of the European Parlia-
ment in the decision-making process of the European Community.
Emphasis will be placed on the authority the Parliament acquired in
the budgetary procedures of the Community in 1970. In this context,
the paper will continue on to investigate whether these amended
budgetary procedures could serve as the foundation, in both a legal
and a practical sense, towards an increase of the Parliament's au-
thority within the institutional framework of the Community.
The paper will further attempt to determine the degree to
which the European Community has established goals for a greater
European union. Two major reports by the Community concerning
institutional reform and European union will be analyzed in this
context. Finally, the paper will attempt to integrate the analysis
on the definition and concept of a European union in the hope
of projecting the potential of greater participation by the European
Parliament in the decision-making process of the European
Community.
Foundations of the European Community
The legal foundations of the European Communities rest on
the Treaties establishing the European Coal and Steel Community
of 1951, and the Treaties establishing the European Economic
Community and the European Atomic Energy Community, both
of 1957.1 One of the founding fathers of the European Communi-
ties, Robert Schuman 2 saw the establishment of a permanent Euro-
1. Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community,
April 18, 1951 (Office for Official Publications of the European Economic
Communities, Luxembourg, 1973); Treaty Establishing the European Economic
Community, March 25, 1957 (Office for Official Publications of the European
Economic Communities, Luxembourg, 1973) [hereinafter referred to as the
Treaty of Rome] ; Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Com-
munity, March 25, 1957. These treaties are reprinted in E. Stein, P. Hay and M.
Waelbroeck, Documents for European Community Law and Institutions in
Perspective, 1-98, 206-245 (1976) [hereinafter referred to as Stein, Hay and
Waelbroeck].
2. Mr. Schuman, while serving as Minister of Foreign Affairs for
France, was a plenipotentiary to the European Coal and Steel Community.
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pean peace as the overriding principle to guide the unification of
Europe. To this end he proposed the creation of a European Coal
and Steel Community to ensure supranational control over this
vital industrial sector, thereby creating the foundation of a perma-
nent reconciliation of differences between France and Germany. 3
It was through economic, not political, unity that Schuman
envisioned the establishment of permanent peace in Europe. The
"deeper unity" is the only reference he makes to a unity that goes
beyond the proposed economic unity. Schuman's vagueness as
to political unity is reflected in the preamble of the Treaty of
Rome,4 which speaks of "an ever-increasing union among the
peoples of Europe," 5 but gives this concept no further concrete
consideration throughout the Treaty. Instead the preamble and
Article 3 specify goals that are purely economic and social in con-
tent. 6 The question of a political union is left unanswered in the
See Stein, Hay and Waelbroeck, supra note 1, at 1.
3. Die Solidaritat der Produktion, die so geschaffen wird, wird
bekunden, dass jeder Krieg zwischen Frankreich und Deutschland
nicht nur undenkbar, sondern materiell unmoglich ist. Die Schaff-
ung dieser machtigen Produktionsgemeinschaft, die allen Landern
offensteht . . . wird die realen Fundamente zu ihrer wirtschaft-
lichen Vereinigung legen....
So wird einfach und rasch die Zusammenfassung der
Interessen verwirklicht, die fur die Schaffung einer Wirtschafts-
gemeinschaft unerlasslich ist und das Ferment einer weiteren und
tieferen Gemeinschaft der Lander einschliesst, die lange Zeit durch
blutige Fehden getrennt waren....
The solidarity of production thus established will create a
situation in which any war between Germany and France would be
not only unthinkable, but materially impossible. The creation of
this mighty production community, open to all countries . . .will
establish the real basis for their economic unification....
In this way the commonality of interests that is indispensable
for the creation of an economic community is quickly and simply
realized, and the seeds of a deeper and more thoroughgoing com-
munity of countries that were long divided by bloody strife are
sown....
[The translation into English is that of the staff of this Journal.]
Europaische Integration, Schriftenreihe der Bundeszentrale fur politische
Bildung 716 (Bernd Janssen ed. 1979) [hereinafter referred to as Europaische
Integration].
4. Supra, note 1.
5. Treaty of Rome, supra, note 1.
6. Id. The preamble states the desire of the member states to
"strengthen the unity of their economies ... " [emphasis added]. id. Article
3 sets forth a series of specific economic goals including elimination of customs
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Treaties, and at least one scholar on the subject has suggested that
including the Assembly in the institutional framework of the Euro-
pean Communities was no more than a gesture which lent a repre-
sentative "decor" to the communities. The European Parliament
was, accordingly, given limited powers so as not to interfere with
the economic and technical volition toward economic unity.
7
Accordingly vague are the competences of the Assembly.
Article 137 states that the Assembly "shall exercise the advisory
and supervisionary powers which are conferred upon it by this
Treaty." 8  Legislative initiative and executive functions are left
to the Commission and the Council of Ministers. 9
The Treaty of Rome therefore leaves the Parliament perched
between the Commission and the Council of Ministers, without
substantial authority to hold either institution accountable, or to
participate in the decision-making process of the Community on a
co-equal basis. Neither the Council nor the Commission is there-
for subject to scrutiny by an institution representing the electorate
of Europe. 1 0 Further, until the elections of 1979, the European
Parliament, composed as it was of members of the parliaments of
the member states, only indirectly represented the European public.
The structure of the Community institutions has led to a
highly technical procedure in the decision-making process, which
duties between member states, establishment of common customs tariffs for
non-member countries, abolition of obstacles to the free movement of capital
among the member states, common policies relating to agriculture and trans-
portation and a system to ensure free competition within the Community. Id.
7. See Europaische Integration, supra note 3, at 206-08.
8. Treaty of Rome, supra, note 1.
9. Id. at Articles 145-55.
10. The Treaty of Rome provides for some consultation of the Parlia-
ment by the Council in a number of fields. Article 238 requires the Council
to consult the Parliament concerning the conclusion of treaties between the
Community and third countries. Article 255 similarly provides for consultation
of the Parliament concerning measures in furtherance of Community goals not
specified within the provisions of the Treaty. The Treaty does not lay down,
however, at what point the Council is required to consult with the Parliament
and what measures the Parliament can take if it disagrees with Council decisions.
As to the Commission, the Treaty grants the Parliament some degree
of participation in the Commission's work. Article 143 obligates the Commis-
sion to submit an annual report to Parliament. Article 140 permits members
of Parliament to put oral and written questions to the Commission which
it is obligated to answer. Finally, Article 144 permits the Parliament to force
the resignation of the Commission as a body. Treaty of Rome, supra, note 1.
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has been observed to be the reason for the hesitancy of the Com-
munity to formulate policy outside of the limited goals established
by the Treaty of Rome. 11
As has been noted above, the Treaty's prime objectives are
of an economic nature. 12 It is in this field that the most spectacular
advances toward European union have been made, and it is in this
field that the Parliament has been able to establish a certain degree
of authority within the institutional framework of the Community.
In the area of Community finance, and particularly in the budgetary
procedure, Parliament has become an active participant.
By means of the Merger Treaty of 1965 and the Treaty of
Luxembourg of April 22, 1970, the then six member states estab-
lished a single Council and Commission for all three of the European
Communities. 13  In addition, a timetable was laid down which
provided that by 1975 the Communities would finance their budget
out of their own resources. 14 Prior to that time, the Community
11. See e.g. Scheuing, Integration by Law: The Case of the European
Community, 11 Texas Intl L.J.549 (1976).
This commentator states that:
the relative inefficiency of the decision-making process
in the Community is also partly due to its more or
less undemocratic character. The persons on the Council
are not elected in a European election, but in normal
national elections for national objectives; they thus lack,
not only motivation, but also sufficient democratic
legitimacy for handling communal affairs as such.
Moreover, the Council meets in camera, and the meet-
ings are largely determined by the Permanent Repre-
sentative Committee which also works secretly. There
is little doubt that bodies constituted and proceeding
in such a way are unable to mobilize the popular sup-
port needed for any coherent and farsighted European
policy. Id. at 561.
12. See note 6 supra.
13. Treaty Establishing a Single Council and a Single Commission of
the European Communities (Merger Treaty) April 8, 1965 (Office for Official
publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 1973); reprinted
in Stein, Hay and Waelbroeck, supra note 1, at 245; Treaty Amending Certain
Budgetary Provisions of the Treaties Establishing the European Communities
and of the Treaty establishing a Single Council and a Single Commission of the
European Communities April 22, 1970 (Office of Official publications of the
European Communities, Luxembourg, 1973); reprinted in Stein, Hay and Wael-
broeck, supra note 1, at 40 [hereinafter cited as Treaty Amending Certain
Budgetary Provisions].
14. See E. Stein, P. Hay, M. Waelbroeck, European Community Law
1980]
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had relied on financial contributions by the member states. As
these contributions had to be agreed on by the parliamentary insti-
tutions of the member states, the Council had sole authority over
the budget at the Community level. Once, however, the Community
was to finance itself, the democratic control over the Community
budget that the member Parliaments had previously exercised was
no longer present, and the European Parliament stepped in to exer-
cise democratic legitimacy in this field. 15
The key article concerning the community budget is Article
203. This article, as amended in 1970, calls for two readings of
the draft budget by the Council and Parliament respectively. Spe-
cifically, the article calls for several steps to be taken by each insti-
tution before the draft budget will be given effect.
Step 1. Before July 1, each institution draws up estimates
for the following year.
Step 2. All estimates are forwarded to the Commission,
which consolidates them and prepares estimates
of revenues and expenditures for the Community
as a whole.
Step 3. The Commission places the draft budget before
the Council no later than September 1.
Step 4. The Council, using the Commission's proposals,
prepares a draft budget which it forwards to the
Parliament by October 5.'
Step 5. The Parliament has forty-five days to make amend-
ments to the draft budget. Should it not amend the
budget it is deemed passed. The draft budget then
returns to the Council for a second reading.
Step 6. The Council may then reject any parliamentary pro-
posals that do not have the effect of increasing ex-
penditures by a qualified majority, whereas amend-
ments increasing expenditures have to be expressly
accepted by a qualified majority. 16
and Institutions in Perspective 46-48 (1976). These resources include revenue
from agricultural levies, customs duties and value added tax. The revenues are
collected by the member states but "belong wholly to the Community." Id.
at 48.
15. See 21 OJ. Eur. Comm. (No. L 36) 9-11 (1975); see also Shaw,
The European Parliament and the Community Budget 9-11 (1978) [hereinafter
referred to as Shaw].
'16. Treaty of Rome, supra note 1, as amended by the Treaty Amending
Certain Budgetary Provisions, supra note 13 at Art. 4, and Treaty Amending
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Under the old Article 203,17 the Council could now declare
the budget adopted. Under the Treaty amendments of 1970 and
1975, the draft budget is sent back to the Parliament for a second
reading and there it may be amended once more before the final
adoption. 18 Under the new procedure, Parliament has the authority
to reject the draft budget as a whole.
As impressive as this new budgetary procedure may appear
at first glance from the Parliament's point of view, the new Article
203 must be seen as a whole, and in the perspective of the other
Treaty provisions concerning the Community budget. Thus, under
article 203(9) the Commission sets a maximum rate of increase
which may be surpassed only by a mutual understanding between
the Council and the Parliament. 19 The possibility of substantial
increases in the budget is thereby checked by an institution out-
side the Parliament's authority. Further, it should not be forgotten
than in 1977 the whole Community budget did not amount to more
than 2.4 percent of the total budgets of the nine member states. 20
Although Parliament has the power to reject the budget, the
amended Article 203 does not provide Parliament with any sub-
stantial authority to initiate budget proposals. 2 1 Article 204 pro-
vides that in case the budget is not adopted prior to the new financial
year (January 1) the Council shall have the right to authorize ex-
penditures according to the previous budget, monthly expenditures
Certain Financial Provisions of the Treaties Establishing the European Com-
munities and of the Treaty Establishing a Single Commission of the European
Communities, July 22, 1975, at Art. 12 (General Secretariat of the Council of
the European Communities, Brussels, 1975), reprinted in Stein, Hay and
Waelbroeck, supra note 1, at 256 [hereinafter referred to as Treaty Amending
Certain Financial Provisions].
17. Treaty of Rome, supra note 1.
18. Treaty Amending Certain Financial Provisions, supra note 16, at
Art. 12; Treaty Amending Certain Budgetary Provisions, supra note 13, at
Art. 4.
19. Treaty of Rome, supra note 1, as amended by the Treaty Amending
Certain Financial Provisions, supra note 16, at Art. 12. Article 203(9) of the
Treaty of Rome, as amended, provides that the maximum rate of increase
will be declared by the Commission. A higher rate may be set "by agreement
between the Council, acting by a qualified majority, and the Assembly, acting
by a majority of its members and three-fifths of the votes cast." Id.
20. 21 OJ. Eur. Comm. (No. L 36) 7 (1978). See Shaw,supra note 15,
at 7.
21. See Treaty of Rome, supra note 1, as amended by Treaty Amending
Certain Financial Provisions, supra note 16, at Art. 12.
1980]
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not to exceed one-twelfth of the previous year's budget.22 Finally,
the Parliament's budgetary rights are drastically curtailed by the
fact that the expenditures provided for in the budget are classified
either compulsory or non-compulsory expenditures. Compulsory
expenditures are those expenditures which are laid down in the
Treaties themselves, or which have their foundation in secondary
Community legislation (regulations or directives). 2 3  Non-
compulsory expenditures make up the rest of the Community
budget. Under Article 203, the Parliament's increased authority
and participation in the budgetary procedures apply only to non-
compulsory items. As to compulsory expenditures, amendments
made by the Parliament to the Council's budget proposals have
to be expressly adopted by a weighted majority vote in the Council.
Should the Council refuse to act on these proposals they are auto.
matically deemed rejected. 24
Budgetary Proceedings
The new budgetary procedures were first applied to the 1975
budget. In 1970, the President of the Council, M. Harmel, drew up
a list of which expenditures were to be considered compulsory and
non-compulsory. According to this list, only 3.6 percent of the
Community budget was categorized as non-compulsory. Thereby
Parliament's participation in the budgetary procedure was con-
siderably limited25
The Commission's view regarding the expenditure categories
mirrored that of the Council. However, it suggested that non-
compulsory expenditures should be increased to exclude only those
"which do not result automatically from previous long-term de-
cision." 26 The Commision's proposal categorized as non-compulsory
22. Id. at Art. 13.
23. See D.. Marguand, Parliament for Europe 95 (1979) "Parliament
can propose modifications in the 'obligatory' sector only by an absolute
majority of its total membership, but amendments in the 'non-obligatory'
sectors can be passed by a simple majority of the members present." Id.
24. Treaty Amending Certain Financial Provisions, supra note 16, at
Art. .12.
25. Ehlermann, Applying the New Budgetary Procedure for the First
Time, 12 C.M.L. Rev. 325, 329 (1975) [hereinafter referred to as Ehlermann];
see also id. at n. 10.
26. Bull. E.C. Supp. 9/73 at 5.
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all those expenditures which were mixed in character, that is to say,
where either the objective or the amount to be spent had been fixed,
but not both.27 These included expenditures for the New Social
Fund, the Regional Fund and various expenditures for scientific
and technological research. 28 The Commission's proposal raised
non-compulstory expenditures to approximately 22.6 percent
of the Community budget. The Council had preferred to retain
mixed expenditures as unclassified but pressure from Parliament
moved the Council toward adoption of the Commission's proposal.2 9
This decision was of particular importance with reference to the
Regional Fund, as this Fund comprises the largest non-compulsory
expenditure of the Community. Although both the size and com-
mitment of the Regional Fund had been established by the European
Council at the Paris Summit of December 9-10, 1974,30 the Com-
mission had included the Fund under non-compulsory expenditures.
The Council regulation which established the Fund fixed appro-
priations for commitments but not for payments. Although the
payments may not exceed the appropriations for commitments,
the actual amount of the payments remains discretionary. It was this
discretion as to payments that gave the Commission the legal founda-
tion to classify the expenditures under the Regional Fund as non-
compulsory. The Commission was quick to point out, however, that
its cooperation with the Parliament on the issue of expenditure
classifications was not a political statement as to the authority of
the Parliament. 31  Under pressure of these two institutions, the
Council of Ministers acceded to the proposals of the Commission.
The meetings of the European Council between the leaders of
the nine member governments, have become a standard procedure in
the process of formulating community policy. The institu-
tionalization of the European Council is a development that has
27. 21 OJ. Eur. Comm. (No. L 36) 16 (1978).
28. Id. Mixed expenditures were seen to be primarily ones relating
to the industrial sector. The Commission felt that expenditures were particu-
larly needed in technological research and development to insure the Communi-
ty's ability to compete in the world-wide markets. Expenditures for the New
Social Fund are aimed at alleviating unemployment and those for the Regi3nal
Fund at countering divergcnce in development within the Community. Id.
29. Ehlermann,supra notc 25, at 334.
30. Buff. E.C. 12/74 at 47; see Ehlermann, supra note 25, at 335-36
and n. 22.
31. See id. at 335-37.
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no legal foundation in the Treaty of Rome. 3 2 Concerning its delib-
erations on the Regional Fund, the European Council appears to
function in contradiction to the Treaty. Thus, Article 203(10)
reads as follows:
Each institution shall exercise the powers
conferred upon it by this Article, with due re-
gard for the provisions of the Treaty, and for
acts adopted in accordance therewith, in particu-
lar those relating to the Communities' own33
resources ....
The de facto establishment of the European Council as the
fifth and most authoritative institution of the Community under-
mines any attempt by the European Parliament to increase its au-
thority in the decision-making process of the European Communi-
ties. The role of the European Council in the budgetary procedures
was not limited to the 1975 budget, but became apparent again
during the deliberations leading to the Community budget of 1978.
In March of 1977, the Commission first sent out an assessment
of the Communities' budgetary situation to both the Council of
Ministers and the Parliament. This was done in order to enable both
institutions to formulate views on guidelines for the 1978 budget. 34
The Budget Committee of the Parliamnent submitted a report to the
Commission in which it approved of the long-term borrowing
schemes proposed by the Commission. The Parliamentary report fur-
ther emphasized the need for the budgetary procedures to reflect ini-
tiatives toward the "building of Europe." The new budget was seen
by the Parliament to be not merely an accounting tool but as rather
the fiscal policy for the near future of the European Communities. 3 5
When the Commission presented the draft budget to the other
institutions, it expressed the necessity for the financial projections
to reflect the objective of greater unification. 3 6 This notwithstand-
ing, the draft budget contained proposals dedicating 71 percent of
all expenditures to the agricultural sector. Under the Common
32. See Treaty of Rome, supra note 1.
33. Treaty of Rome, supra note 1, as amended by Treaty Amending
Certain Financial Provisions, supra note 16, at Art. 12(10).
34. 21 OJ. Eur. Comm. (No. L 36) 14 (1978). See Shaw, supra note
15, at 14.
35. 21 OJ. Eur. Comm. (No. L 36) 16 (1978). See Shaw, supra note
15, at 16.
36. 21 OJ. Eur. Comm. (No. L 36) 16 (1978).
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A.ricultural Policy of the Communities these expenditures are com-
pulsory, 7 and continue to dominate Community expenditures.
When the representatives of the Parliament met with the Coun-
cil members in July of 1977, differences of opinion concerning the
draft budget were immediately apparent. Whereas Parliament's
proposals focused on increases in budgetary spending of long-term
non-compulsory expenditures, the Council members were more in-
clined toward a pruned budget that would reflect the then current
economic situation within the member states. 3 8
When the Council returned the draft budget to the Parliament
for the second reading, the draft contained proposals for an increase
in agricultural spending and, correspondingly, major cutbacks in
the non-agricultural sectors. At the second reading, the Parliament
expressed dissatisfaction with the Council's alterations and its un-
willingness to discuss the long-term proposals that both the Com-
mission and the Parliament had established in the preliminary reports
on budgetary expenditures. In particular, it was felt that the Coun-
cil's proposals did not adequately provide for the implementation
of new policies in the area of research. It was also felt that the
Council's proposals would halt efforts to improve the economic
balance within the Community and would provide no funding to
counter major social problems such as unemployment and regional
deprivations.3 9
A record 210 amendments were annexed to the Council's
draft, and it was further pointed out that, as the Community budget
comprised less than 1 percent of the gross domestic product of the
nine member states, the Community budget could not have a sub-
stantial influence on the economic situation in Europe. On October
26, the Parliament voted for the proposed amendments. On behalf
of the Commission, Mr. Tugenhat expressed the Commission's ap-
preciation of the Parliamentary debates concerning the draft budget,
and on November 22 Parliamentary representatives met with the
Council for a second time. Although at this meeting agreement was
reached on most of the amendments proposed by the Parliament,
disagreement continued over the Regional Fund. Parliament had
voted for the Commission's proposal on the Fund on October 26.
The Council now sought significant reductions in the proposal,
and at the second conciliation meeting an impasse between the
37. Id. at 17.
38. Id. at 20.
39. Id.
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Parliament and the Council had been reached.
The Council now had only one more day, until November
23, to decide whether to adopt the figures proposed by Parliament
or to reject them. Both sides decided to submit the figures for the
Regional Fund to the European Council at its summit meeting
on December 5-6 in Brussels.4 As under Article 203, any decision
by the European Council altering proposals on non-compulsory
expenditures would have to be verified by the Parliament at the
second reading of the draft budget. The Council Press Release on the
meeting of the European Council read as follows:
At the meeting with the delegation from
the European Parliament, which was held in
the course of budgetary cooperation, both
parties put [forth] their respective views . ..
Referring to the Regional Fund, the Council
informed the European Parliament of the
European Council's decision to set the com-
mitment appropriations for 1978 at 580 million
(E.U.A.) 4 1
The significance of this extended second reading on the draft
budget lies in the fact that, as in 1974, the European Council re-
solved an issue concerning non-compulsory expenditures. The
European Parliament's control over the non-compulsory expendi-
tures in the budget as provided for by the Treaty amendments of
1970 and 1975 was once again undermined. Parliament's reaction
to this measure was one of frustration. After an extended debate
on whether to insist on the original amendments by the Parliament,
a majority finally voted for the Council proposals, and therefore
in favor of political compromise. Although the Parliament insisted
on raising the commitment appropriations for the Regional Fund
by one million European Units of Accounting over the Council's
proposal, this was no more than an assertion of Parliament's right to
have the final word. On December 21, 1977, the President of the
Parliament, Sr. Columbo, declared the 1978 budget finally
adopted.4 2
These proceedings graphically demonstrate the attempt by the
Parliament to increase its power of initiative in financial matters
.40. 21 OJ. Eur. Comm. (No. L 36) 25-26 (1978).
41. Id. at 26.
42. Id. at 27.
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of the Community. Although the Treaty provides Parliament with
no legal basis for such a power of initiative, the 1978 budgetary
proceedings demonstrate how the Parliament was able to increase
its authority within the existing legal framework of the 1970 Treaty
amendment. In the case of 1978 budget the Parliament did not
follow this procedure through to the final consequence of actually
rejecting the budget. But the proceedings concerning the 1978
budget demonstrated how the Parliament can use its veto powers
to establish a degree of positive power of initiative in the shaping
of long-term financial policies for the Community. A rejection
of the Budget in 1977 might have resulted in a confrontation with
the European Council which is in no way accountable to the
Parliament.
In 1979, the first directly elected European Parliament felt
it possessed the authority needed to confront the Council of Minis-
ters over the budgetary question. On December 13, 1979, Parlia-
ment rejected the draft budget for 1980. As in previous years the
disagreement leading to the rejection of the budget resulted from
the Council's decision to increase agricultural spending at the ex-
pense of non-compulsory expenditures. 43  The budgetary powers
of the Parliament delineate the outer limits of Parliamentary au-
thority within the decision-making process of the Communities.
What remains to be analyzed is the general direction the European
Community is taking in its effort to reach a European union and
the role of the Parliament in this process.
The Tindeinans Report
When the original time-table set out by the Treaty of Rome
for the Common Market was met by 1969, the concept of a Euro-
pean union appeared at the stage where political integration should
follow economic unity. By 1976, the concept of a European union
remained to be clearly defined. At the end of his report, Leo Tinde-
mans, assessing the situation of the European Community, remarks
that the goals of a union are ambiguous. The desire for such a union
is nonetheless present, as has been expressed by all the institutions
of the Community. Tindemans concludes that a union will not
take the form of a European state. Rather, the process of European
43. Shanks, Now Let Euro-MPs Use Their Muscle, The Times (London),
Jan. 25, 1980, at 12, col. 1.
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integration should aim to abrogate the artificial contrasts that are
the result of national sovereignty in order to establish a more hu-
mane society with emphasis on the homogeneity of the peoples
of the European continent, while at the same time respecting na-
tional and cultural identities.
44
This sentiment has been echoed elsewhere. According to
Willy Zeller, integratibn is not only an intellectual exercise but
an evolutionary, process toward an education of understanding
your neighbor. 5 This is a far cry from the challenge to create a
European federation. Indeed, it seems that the creation of such a
federation would encounter insurmountable difficulties. It is
questionable whether the member states, with a long history of
political independence, would subordinate such achievements as
those of the French Revolution or the Glorious Revolution to a
European federation, thereby surrendering a long history of consti-
tutional identity and sovereignty. The divergence of the political
infrastructures of the member states would render the attempted
creation of the "United States of Europe" virtually impossible.
The problem is aggravated by the fact that supranational integration
suffers from a lack of historical precedent and is therefore perma-
nently handicapped by a lack of definition. 46
The vaguess as to both definition and implementation of a
European union places the European Parliament in an ambivalent
position within the institutional framework of the Communities.
Without a sense of direction toward union, the Parliament will find
it difficult to assert itself on a par with the other institutions within
the Communities.
After the elections of 1979, the Parliament's base of legitimacy
shifted from the parliaments of the member states to the electorate.
It therefore no longer represents the nine member Parliaments in
the Community. It is, however, to those Parliaments that the Coun-
cil of Ministers and the European Council are ultimately responsible.
As a result, the Council of Ministers may now find itself less inclined
to take the European Parliament's views into consideration. As
the members of the European Parliament are for the most part
no longer also members of national parliaments, the Parliament
may find it even more difficult to establish its authority over the
44. Tindemans, European Union, Bull. E.C. Supp. 1/76, 12 [herein-
after referred to as The Tindemans Report).
45. Europaische Integration, supra note 3, at 210-11.
46. Id. at 206.
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Council of Ministers. Although the elections have bestowed on
the European Parliament democratic legitimacy, the elections may
prove to create an institutional conflict of interests which could
impede further establishment of parliamentary control within
the Community.
It is from this angle that proposals for institutional reform
within the Communities have to be viewed. In this context it is
appropriate to determine the role played by parliamentary insti-
tutions in the governments of the nine member states. David
Coombes analyzes -two trends that have led to the diminished re-
sponsibilities of parliaments in western Europe. The growth of
the executive organs within the government structure is listed as
the first reason for the decline of parliamentary authority.
The methods of government have become
more specialised, technical and complex and
its power more discretionary, less easily
bounded within legal definition. Not only are
specific legislative powers increasingly delegated
to executive departments but, . . . general
legislation itself has declined in importance. ....
The extension of government in the economic
and social spheres has also brought a multipli-
cation of semi-autonomous state agencics,
deliberately excluded in many respects from
direct parliamentary control. 4 7
The second reason for the decline of parliamentarianism in Europe
is the increased participation of the general public in the formation
of governments, i.e., the extension of franchise rights over the past
hundred years in Europe. This, according to Coombes, has led to the
growth in importance of centrally organized
mass political parties. The official support of
such a party and of its organization is now virtu-
ally indispensable for effectively contesting
elections by universal suffrage and the parties
are usually able to maintain discipline among
their members in parliament itself. As a result,
the mass political parties have become an effec-
tive substitute for the traditional role of parlia-
47. D. Coombes, The Future of the European Parliament 67.68 (Studies
in European Politics I, R. Morgan ed. 1978).
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ment in many respects and are certainly now
the principal organs of political representation . 4 8
Contemporary parliaments in Western Europe serve the func-
tion of supplying a public forum which furnishes communication
between the public and the executive. Moreover, Coombes perceives
the Parliaments as organs which check the administration and
thereby lend democratic legitimacy to the governments in office.
It is within this definition of parliamentary authority in con-
temporary Western Europe that two proposals for institutional
reform of the European Communities will be examined. At the
Paris summit of 1974, Leo Tindemans was asked to submit a compre-
hensive report on the European Communities.4 9 Tindeman's report,
published in 1976, stressed that European union lacked "the legiti-
nacy needed for control." 5 0  To this end he proposed that the
authority of the European Parliament be increased. Specifically,
he suggested that its influence could be increased by permitting it
to debate on the state of the union once a year, that the President
of the Commission should be appointed by the Parliament and that
its powers of initiative should be increased and incorporated by
an amendment into the legal structure of the treaties. This power
of initiative would permit the Parliament to address its proposals
to the Council, which would be obligated to consider them.5 1 The
powers of initiative proposed by Tindemans do not represent a
radical departure from the Treaty provisions concerning Parliament's
authority over non-compulsory expenditures in the budgetary
procedures.
At the other end of the spectrum, Tindemans recommends
an increased role for the European Council. Here his proposals
are more specific than those concerning the Parliament. They
would permit the European Council to determine general policy
outlines, to determine the institutions to implement such policies
and to determine time schedules for their completion. It is with
regard to the European Council that the Tindemans Report departs
most from the existing institutional framework of the Community.
As envisioned by the Report, the increased role of the European
Council would severely limit the authority of the European
48. Id. at 68;see id. at 66-68.
49. See Mitchell, The Tindemans Report-Retrospect and Prospe. t,
13 C.A.L. Rev. 455,456 (1976) [hereinafter referred to as Mitchell].
50. The Tindemans Report,supra note 44, at 13.
51. Id.
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Parliament.
As the European Council comprises the heads of the member
govrnments, the Parliament will have little, if any, impact on it.
52
Thus, Tindemans would permit Parliament greater authority over
the Council of Ministers only to remove the actual base of policy-
making to another institution beyond Parliament's grip. The conse-
quence of an increased role of the European Council in the decision-
making process of the Community is reflected in the debates over
the size of the Regional Fund in 1978.
The Report of the Committee of Three
In a more recent report of the state of the European Com-
munities presented by the Committee of Three to the European
Council, the assessment of the position of the European Parliament
within the institutional framework of the Communities is sobering. 53
The Parliament is perceived to be situated between an ever-weakening
Commission, over which it has some formal control, and the ever-
increasing powers of the Council which has demonstrated a reluc-
tance to permit an increase in Parliament's authority beyond the
narrow leal definitions of the amended budget proceedings of 1970
- and 1975. 
4
The Report does not propose that any new authority outside
the present legal structure be given to the Parliament. Rather, its
suggestions seek to foster Parliament's position as a sounding board
for Community policy.5 5 Cooperation with the Council is proposed
52. Id.
53. See e.g. Mitchell, supra note 49, at 466-70.
54. Committee of Three, Report on the European Institutions, (1979).
The successive Treaty amendments of 1970 and 1975
gave Parliament the right of the last word on "non-
obligatory" expenditure, subject to some complex rules
on the overall annual increase. Since the class of non-
obligatory expenditure now constitutes over 20 percent
of the Budget and covers most Community projects and
policies apart from the Common Agricultural Policy,
this puts the Parliament in a strong position to impress
its own concept of policy development upon the
Council.
Id. at 75.
55. See generally id. at 74.
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through budgetary reform with recommendations for a more exten-
sive use of the conciliation procedures between the two institu-
tions.5 6 The Report does not go as far as the Tindemans Report
concerning Treaty Amendments to increase the powers of legislative
initiative of the Parliament. Instead, the report states that realistic
control of the Council lies with the parliaments of the member
states and that the European Parliament will increase authority
only through increased cooperation with those institutions. 57 The
report emphasizes the responsibility of the Commission and the
Presidency of the Council to take the initiative to encourage an
increased involvement of the Parliament in the decision-making
process of the Community so as to increase cooperation between
Parliament and the other institutions.5 8
Finally, the report acknowledges the increasing importance
of the European Council as a Community institution, and suggests
that its relations with the Parliament have to be improved. 59 The
report's proposals in this area show even more circumspectness
than those concerning the Parliament's relations with the other
institutions.60
Provided this relationship is developed
with due respect for the competences of all
institutions involved, it would lead to a valuable
cooperation in the launching of major initiatives
and help the Parliament to develop its full
potential as a sounding board for the large
policy issues of the day. 6
This conservative view of the future direction of the European
Parliament must be seen in light of the report's assessment of the
future of European union. This assessment is based on economic
changes that have ensued since 1973, which the report calls the
"end of an epoch.' 412 The report stresses the need to secure the
56. Id. at 34. The Report states that the resolution of conflicts can now
be attempted only at the European Council level. See also id. at 76 wherein
it is stated that it was to anticipate and avoid budgetary conflicts that the
"conciliation" procedure was introduced by a Joint Declaration of the three
institutions in 1975.
57. Id. at 76-78.
58. Id. at 79.
59. Id. at 81.
60. Id. at 80.
61. Id. at 81.
62. Id. at 101. The epoch lasted twenty-five years. Growth rates
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accomplishments of the past; "the free movement of industrial and
agricultural goods, of services, capital and labour and the common
policies serving these goals.' 4 3  The report concludes that the
present world economic situation necessitates a careful and sensi-
tive cooperation among the member governments within the
Community. 6
4
Prospects for the Future
It is uncertain how long the Parliament will continue to enjoy
public support if it does not achieve an increase in its authority.
As the actual decision-making process of the Community moves
away from the Council of Ministers to the European Council, the
powers recently acquired by the Parliament in the budgetary pro-
ceedings will scarcely serve as a foundation onto which further
powers of initiative can be built.
If member governments continue the policy of determining
directions for Community policies from summit meetings, the
Parliament will, if anything, decrease in authority. The demo-
cratic legitimacy gained from the elections justifies an increase in
its powers to shape community policies. 65 Without this increase
in stature it is likely to lose the popular support that gave it its
democratic legitimacy. It is thus caught in a vicious circle. The
rejection of the 1980 draft budget could therefore be interpreted
as an attempt to breach this circle. 66
Both the Tindemans Report and the recent Report of the
Three have acknowledged the increased role the leaders of the
member governments play in the decision-making process in the
Community. The budgetary proceedings in recent years have shown
how Parliament's already limited authority can be further diminished
by the member governments. In light of the weakening of volition
for a European union, the Parliament must achieve a degree of
recognition beyond mere lip service from the European Council,
in order to increase its credibility with the electorate. The Parlia-
approaching 5.6 percent which existed in some European countries cannot be
expected in the foreseeable future according to the report. Id.
63. Id. at 106.
64. Id.
65. The first elections to the Parliament by direct universal suffrage
were held inJune, 1979. Id. at 76.
66. See text accompanying note 20, supra.
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ment could achieve this by increased cooperation with the parlia-
ments of the member states and the national party structures.
Once this cooperation has been established, the European
Parliament could become the platform to which the other institu-
tions, particularly the European Council, would bring proposals
for Community policy for discussion. This, in turn, could increase
Parliament's role as an initiator of policy. The budgetary proceed-
ings have demonstrated Parliament's ability to turn its negative
powers of veto and amendment into a process of recommendation
and initiative. 67
As both Tindemans and the Committee of Three have already
suggested in their respective reports, the volition toward a political
union of Europe has clearly subsided.68 This does not mean, how-
ever, that an increasingly close cooperation of the member states
within the Community may not occur. The great advances that
have been achieved since the foundation of the European Coal
and Steel Community speak for themselves. Prior to 1945 a Com-
mon Agricultural Policy as it exists in contemporary Europe would
have seemed unimaginable.
With the exception of factions in the United Kingdom and
Denmark, most Europeans today do not question the existence
or desirability of the Community. Certainly, however, the Euro-
pean Community has shown itself to be slow in formulating goals
outside of the legal parameters of the Treaty of Rome. Whether
this development has been the result of the unstable global economic
situation is open to speculation. The report by the Committee of
Three suggests 1973 to have been a turning point in the develop-
ment of the European Community. It seems clear that the Euro-
pean economies have been gripped by a sense of insecurity, under
the pressure of which the European Community has not seen fit
to further objectives toward a political union. It is in this atmos-
phere of uncertainty that Greece has recently joined the Community,
as will Spain and Portugal in the near future. The accession of these
countries with their distinct economic situations will, no doubt,
further tax the commitment of the Community to a closer coopera-
tion among the member states.
In this situation it would seem highly inappropriate for the
Parliament to advocate radical structural changes within the institu-
.67. See text accompanying notes 34-43, supra.
68. See Committee of Three, Report on the European Institutions,
.103 (1979).
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tional framework of the Community. As suggested by both Tinde-
mans and the Committee of Three, the Parliament should attempt to
establish itself as the stabilizing institution, balancing the interests of
the Community with the interests of the individual member states. In
this function, the Parliament could well contribute to a greater non-
political unification of Europe. It has already demonstrated its ability
to function in this capacity, as its initiaties in the budgetary proceed-
ings have shown. 69 Initiatives toward an increase in the Regional
Fund will do more in the short run toward a greater cooperation and
unification among the member states, than will calls for an increased
political union. At the same time, such a policy will not encroach
upon the authority of the European Council, which would retain the
initiative in the political decision-making process.
The Parliament would gain the authority to force the Council
of Ministers to increase its attention to parliamentary initiatives by
aligning public opinion, the member parliaments and the political
parties, national as well as supranational, behind it. Again, the
revised budgetary proceedings have laid the legal foundations for
such a cooperation. Equally, the Parliament could level its demo-
cratic legitimacy against the secretive decision-making process of
the European Council and persuade it to account for its policy
decisions in the plenary sessions of the Parliament. Finally, in its
relations with the Commission, an increase in the Parliament's esteem
within Europe could benefit both institutions. The Commission
would find an attentive forum for its initiatives in the Parliament,
and this in turn would bring the Commission to the attention of the
European public, thereby strengthing its position vis-i-vis the Council
of Ministers. As the budgetary proceedings in recent years have
shown the Commission shares several policy goals with the Parlia-
ment.yo Increased cooperation would be more likely if the Com-
mission could see the Parliament as a vehicle to publicize its initia-
tives. This closer cooperation would not only benefit both institu-
tions, but also have a mutually reinforcing effect on them. Par-
liament's authority would be enhanced by becoming the sounding
board for legislative initiative within the Community, and the Com-
mission would be in a stronger bargaining position with the Council
of Ministers, in the knowledge that its initiatives have been exposed
to the scrutiny of the institution directly representing the European
public.
69. See text accompanying notes 34-43, supra.
70. See 12 Bull. E. C., 93-94, 100 (1979).
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The European Parliament cannot achieve the stature that
David Coombes ascribes to parliamentary institutions in contem-
porary European governments for the simple reason that the Euro-
pean Community does not have a government structure comparable
to that of a member state. As both the Tindemans Report and the
report by the Committee of Three have shown, the support for a
European federation that accompanied the economically successful
years between 1957 and 1973 has subsided. 71 The European Com-
munity became more cautious as a result, and a sense of realism
concerning its future seems to prevail. With the accession of the
Mediterranean countries, the Community will be faced with further
challenges. These challenges will perhaps affect the very principles
and goals espoused by the Treaty of Rome. The Parliament should
therefore see its main objective to be-lending support toward the
accomplishment of the goals which serve as the foundation for the
Treaty of Rome.
Axel Heydasch
71. See generally Committee of Three, Report on the European Insti-
tutions, 100 (1979).
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